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Introduction 
 
World War I pointed out a fundamental flaw in the balance of power system. When 
the system failed, the result was dangerous and catastrophic. The incredible levels 
of destruction in the war led most nation-states to reject a balance of power system 
as the basis for international security in the post-World War I. Instead, the 
victorious states sought to institutionalize a system of collective security via the 
League of Nations in which aggression by one state would bring response from all 
states; collective security would thus be achieved. 
The achievement of this “collective security” would be based on the principle that 
an attack on one is an attack on all. Any state contemplating aggression would face 
the sure prospect of struggle not simply with the prospective victim, but with all 
other members of the system, who would make any necessary sacrifice to save the 
state attacked. In a hypothetical world of collective security, the assumption is that 
the members of the system will have such an overwhelming preponderance of 
power that will be so unreservedly committed to the principles they have endorsed 
that aggression will become quite irrational; presumably, it will not occur or if it 
should occur, it will be defeated. The League of Nations and the United Nations are 
two post-World War (first and second World Wars) agencies under which the 
collective security system has been used as machinery for joint action for the 
prevention or counter of any attack against an established international order. 
The objective of collective security is to frustrate any attempt by states to change 
the status quo with overwhelming force because a change in the status quo entails a 
change to the world order of independent sovereign states. This was meant to 
muster overpowering collective force, which could threaten and then applied to end 
aggression by revisionist states and other would-be aggressors. 
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Meaning And Nature Of Collective Security 
According to George Schwarzeberger, collective security is a “machinery for joint 
action in order to prevent or counter any attack against an established international 
order” (schwarzenberger, 1951).The term implies collective measures for dealing 
with threat to peace. 
Van Dyke (1957) sees collective security as a system in which a number of states 
are bound to engage in collective efforts on behalf of each other’s individual 
security. To A. K. Chaturvedi (2006), collective security is “an arrangement 
arrived at by some nations to protect their vital interests, safety or integrity, against 
a probable threat or menace over a particular period, by means of combining their 
powers.” 
In his conceptual clarification, Onyemaechi Eke (2007) sees the concept of 
collective security as “an idealist one which hinges on the prevention of hostilities 
by the formation of an overwhelming military force by member states to deter 
aggression or, by implication, to launch a reprisal attack capable of defeating the 
recalcitrant member.” According to him, collective security “connotes the 
institutionalization of a global police force against abuse of order and breaches, 
which can lead to insecurity. It is an arrangement in which all states cooperate 
collectively to provide security for all by the actions of all against any state within 
the groups which might challenge the existing order by using force. By employing 
a system of collective security, the United Nations hopes to dissuade any member 
state from acting in a manner likely to threaten peace, thereby avoiding conflict. 
From the above definitions by these eminent scholars, collective security can then 
be seen as a plan for maintaining peace through an organization of sovereign states, 
whose members pledge themselves to defend each other against attack. The 
concept is best seen as “security for individual nation by collective means”, that is, 
by membership in an international organization made up of all or most of the states 
of the world pledged to defend each other from attack. The idea of collective 
security was extensively discussed during the World War I, and it took shape in the 
1919 Covenant of the League of Nations, and again in the Charter of the United 
Nations after Word War II. 
According to Palmer and Perkings (2007), “a collective security system, to be 
effective, must be strong enough to cope with aggression from any power or 
combination of powers, and it must be invoked if and as aggression occurs.” The 
principle of collective security involves a willingness to apply sanctions as and 
when necessary and even to go to war. Collective security will never work unless 
all the nations that take part in it are prepared simultaneously to threaten with 
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sanctions and to fight, if necessary, an aggressor. It must be open to those states 
which are willing to accept its obligations in good faith. 
Rourke and Boyer (1998) assert that collective security is based on four principles: 
first, all countries forswear the use of force except in self defence; second, all agree 
that peace is indivisible, an attack on one is an attack on all; third, all pledge to 
unite to halt aggression and restore the peace; fourth, all agree to supply whatever 
material or personnel resources that are necessary to form a collective security 
force associated with the United Nations or some IGO to defeat aggressors and 
restore the peace. 
The principle of collective security is found in Article 48 and 49 of the Charter of 
the United Nations which states that, “the action required to carry out the decisions 
of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security 
shall be taken by all the members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the 
Security Council may determine; such decisions shall be carried out by the 
members of the United Nations directly or through their action in the appropriate 
international agencies of which they are members.” 
The idea behind the collective security system is that members of the organization 
advancing the collective security system (this time, the United Nations) are bound 
to spring to each other’s defense in case of attack. The basic principle is that an 
attack on one is an attack on all. Any state contemplating aggression would face 
the sure prospect of struggle not simply with the prospective victim, but with all 
other members of the system, who would make any necessary sacrifice to save the 
state attacked. 
“In a hypothetical world of collective security, the assumption is that the members 
of the system will have such an overwhelming preponderance of power and will be 
so unreservedly committed to the principles they have endorsed that aggression 
will become quite irrational; presumably, it will thus not occur, or if it should 
occur, it will be defeated.” (Dyke, 1957) 
 
Problems Of Collective Security 
At the twilight of World War I, many political thinkers thought and hoped that the 
states of the world would make the League of Nations a collective security system 
that would maintain international peace and security, and some had the same hope 
after World War II in connection with the United Nations. Karen Mingst averred 
that collective security is borne out of some salient assumptions. These 
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assumptions are that: wars are prevented by restraint of military action; aggressors 
must be stopped; the aggressor is easily identified; the aggressor is always wrong; 
aggressors know that the international community will act against them (Mingst, 
1999). As asserted by Van Dyke (1957), “they wanted states to abandon narrow 
conceptions of self interest as a guide to policy and to regard themselves as units in 
a world society having an interest in preserving law and order everywhere.” These 
ideas expressed by these scholars could not work out as a result of numerous 
problems associated with the concept of collective security. There are other 
scholars who feel that the concept of collective security is misguided. They see it 
as conceptually muddled and naively unrealistic. Although they are pledged to 
defend each other, many countries will refuse to do so, if such an act is not in their 
own best interests or thought to be too risky or expensive. In addition, they argue 
that collective security arrangements will turn small struggles into large ones, and 
prevent the use of alternative (non-violent) problem solving, relying instead on the 
much more costly approach of military confrontation. In addition, there is always a 
danger that alliances formed by the purpose of collective security can also serve as 
a basis for an aggressive coalition. Other problems associated with the collective 
security system are discussed as follows: 
(i) States do not regard themselves as members of one society having a 
common vital interest in protecting and preserving each other’s rights. Does it 
really matter to Japan if Paraguay and Bolivia destroy themselves in a war? Of 
what interest is it to Nigeria if Egypt should attack Tunisia and such attack is 
repelled or defeated? There is no doubt that states have demonstrated a willingness 
to ally themselves with certain other selected states and thus to pledge to defend 
certain selected frontiers in addition to their own, but the principle of “one for all 
and all for one” does not commend itself. 
 
(ii) Another challenge to collective security is that its risks are great. Governments 
of nation-states can enforce law against individuals with little risk or fear. 
Internationally, however, the situation is quite different. Disparities of power are 
much greater. “Theoretically, it might be easy for a world society to defeat 
aggression by a smaller power like Nigeria, but what if one of the great powers 
turns aggressor?” it is one thing for a government to enforce a law against a hapless 
individual and another thing for the United Nations to try to enforce the law against 
a state which may be almost as strong as the rest of the world combined. The 
development of nuclear weapons makes the problem all the greater. An aggressor 
with such weapons could virtually wipe from the face of the earth a number of the 
members of the collective security system. Faced with such a possibility, a member 
whose own most vital interest was directly threatened might choose proud defiance 
rather than surrender. But a member whose own vital interests were not directly 
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threatened would be unlikely to be so bold. Nor do states want to commit 
themselves in advance to undertake such risks, regardless of the identity of the 
aggressor and of his victim. 
 
(iii) Jones (1985) and Rostow (1968) cited in Eke (2007) are in agreement that the 
principles of the United Nations veto is “a great inhibition to the smooth and 
effective functioning of the Security Council collective security system. In his 
observation, Rostow argued that “part of the problem is that the responsibility of 
world peace was resting on the shoulders of nations with preponderant military and 
political power.” By this, he meant those nations that could become arrogant to 
ignore local wars, revolutions, or conquests on the assumption that they do not 
disturb the general equilibrium of power or endanger the sense of security of the 
system as a whole. 
 
The veto principle of the Security Council of the United Nations was originally 
meant to ensure commitment of the five permanent members to the United Nations. 
It was also meant that no superpower is against any UN action, which can lead to 
outbreak of hostilities (Butler, 1999). The superpowers were expected to exercise 
collective responsibility for the maintenance of global peace and security. But what 
we see today has been unilateral actions by some permanent members of the 
Security Council with veto powers, especially the United States and Great Britain 
against countries they perceive as threats to international peace and security. A 
good example is the invasion of Iraq by the United States and Britain, “this wave of 
American-styled security by domination in place of collective security creates both 
anxiety and curiosity over the weakness of the United Nations Collective Security 
as “sine qua non” for world peace and security. 
 
(iv) The activities of powerful regional organizations have posed a serious 
problem to United Nations Collective Security System. “Experience has shown that 
members of such organizations demonstrate divided loyalty often times with more 
concern to the regional organization than the UN.” (Eke, 2007) Members of 
regional security have often abandoned the UN Collective Security System in 
preference to regional security system. Bulter observed that during the invasion of 
Iraq by the United States “the Security Council – the hub of collective security 
regime was bypassed, defied and abused…” (Butler, 1999). Palmer and Perkings 
agree that the United States and western powers, in their attitudes of placing more 
emphasis on national and regional defence than on collective security as the 
obligation to the Charter of the United Nations are fundamental problems of 
unanimity of the Council and by extension, the cause of failure of security regime. 
(Palmer and Perkins, 2007) 
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In many instances of states and regional conflicts, members of regional security 
abandon the UN. For example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
had helped to bury the optimism, which greeted the UN Collective Security System 
in the 78-day bombing of Yugoslavia, and of course Iraq, after the fall of Soviet 
empire. In these two crises situation, the Security Council which is the hub of 
collective security regime was bypassed. The double allegiance of members of the 
United Nations, especially by the veto-wielding ones, concretely depicts moral 
failure. 
 
Failure Of Collective Security Under The League Of Nations 
Palmer and Perkings observed that the League of Nations was a complete failure as 
an instrument for enforcement of collective security. They cited the failure of the 
United States of America to join the League from the start and the rise of the Soviet 
Union outside the League as one of the major reasons why the League failed as 
instrument for the development and enforcement of collective security. They also 
believed that “the open defiance of Japan, Italy and Germany combined to destroy 
any hopes that the League would be effective in major international crisis.” 
(Palmer and Perkings, 2007) This line of thought was also captured by Charles, 
Kegley. He posits that “the failure stemmed from the U.S. refusal to join the 
organization; the other great powers’ fear that the League’s collective strength 
might be used against them. (Kegley, 2007) 
Another example of the failure of the League of Nations’ collective security is the 
Manchurian crisis when Japan occupied part of China. After the invasion, members 
of the League passed a resolution calling for Japan to withdraw or face severe 
penalties. Given that every nation on the League of Nations Council had veto 
power, Japan promptly vetoed the resolution, severely limiting the League of 
Nations’ ability to respond. After two years of deliberation, the League passed a 
resolution condemning the invasion without committing the League’s members to 
any action against it. The Japanese replied by quitting the League of Nations. 
A similar process occurred in 1935, when Italy invaded Ethiopia. Sanctions were 
passed, but Italy would have vetoed any stronger resolution. Additionally, Britain 
and France sought to court Italy’s government as a potential deterrent to Hitler, 
given that Mussolini was not in what would become the Axis Alliance of World 
War II. Thus, neither enforced any serious sanctions against the Italian 
government. 
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Karen Mingst argued that Collective Security does not always work. She observed 
that the inability of the international community to respond to Japan’s invasion of 
Manchuria and Italy’s assault on Ethiopia was the fundamental differences in state 
interests and ideologies. According to her, “Collective Security does not always 
work. In the period between the two world wars, Japan invaded Manchuria and 
Italy overran Ethiopia. In neither case did other states act as if it were in their 
collective interest to respond…. In this instance, collective security did not work 
because of lack of commitment on the part of other states and an unwillingness of 
the International Community to act in concert. In the post-World War II era, 
Collective Security could not work because of fundamental differences in both 
state interests and ideologies.” (Mingst, 1999) 
Additionally, in this case and with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, the absence 
of the USA from the League of Nations deprived the League of another major 
power that could have used economic leverage against either of the aggressors 
states. Inaction by the League subjected it to criticisms that it was weak and 
concerned more with European issues (most leading members were Europeans) and 
did not deter Hitler from his plans to dominate Europe. 
 
Failure Of Collective Security Under The United Nations 
While Article I of the UN Charter calls for “effective collective measures for the 
prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of 
aggression or other breaches of peace,” Article 43 of the Charter provides that 
members of the UN, in accordance with special agreements to be conducted, are to 
make available to the Security Council “armed forces, assistance and facilities, 
including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international 
peace and security.” These shall take place “if the Security Council finds that an 
act of aggression or other threats to the peace has occurred, and if the parties 
concerned do not comply with such measures as the Council shall deem 
necessary…” (Palmer and Perkings, 2007) 
The United Nations calls for necessary measures to maintain international peace 
and security, including the obligation of states to place at the disposal of the United 
Nations agreed power necessary for an international peace force to be equipped 
with agreed types of armaments. Rather than have an institutionalized collective 
security regime, under the U.N. regularized training, maintenance and command, 
loosely Collective Security mechanism took the force of multinational willingness 
to control troops to promote the U.N. peace agenda. Where there exists an 
aggressor, there is need to collectively counter the attacks of the aggressor and 
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preserve the peace through a Collective Security system. In such a situation no 
member state of the United Nations can claim neutrality, and none would dare to 
support the aggressor. If the aggressor dares to use force, then the combined forces 
of all the other states should so overwhelm the aggressor that hostilities would 
terminate and would cause would-be aggressor to retrace its steps for fear of 
sanction. 
One of the problems of the United Nations Collective Security system is the 
unwillingness of countries to subordinate their sovereign interests to collective 
action. “Thus far, governments have generally maintained their right to view 
conflict in terms of their national interest and to support or oppose UN action based 
on their nationalistic point of view. Collective Security therefore exists mostly as a 
goal, not as a general practice.” (Rourke and Boyer, 1998) 
Another problem which have resulted in the failure of the United Nations 
Collective Security system is the overdependence of the Security Council on the 
member-governments for assistance, especially the United States, Britain, 
Germany, Japan, etc. This overdependence has made these nations act unilaterally 
in conflict situations without approval of the Security Council of the United 
Nations. In some situations, they flout the orders of the Security Council not to act 
unilaterally. The Iraq crisis and the role of the coalition forces, which was molded 
by the United States and Britain is clearer example. “Rather than seek the global 
interest of peace and security through stability in Iraq and the Middle East region, 
the domination oriented members amassed their vast economic, diplomatic and 
military resources, captured and brazenly subjugated Iraq to an unprecedented 
condominial regime serving their economic interest under Iraq Reconstruction 
Programme.” (Eke, 2007) 
This goes to show that the big powers of the world will only agree to cooperate 
with the United Nations in relation to collective security as long as it serves their 
interests. “The larger powers (who, after all, must bear the major burdens of 
enforcing peace under a collective security system) have never been willing to give 
an unconditional commitment to carry out the commands of the world 
organization; they have always reserved for themselves some escape hatch. They 
have never been willing to set up an international army of any significant strength, 
under direct control of the League of Nations or the United Nations without any 
strings attached.” 
Some scholars see the United Nations Collective Security as one-sided system 
whereby lesser and medium powers are ignored during aggression. They argue that 
the United Nations has not completely applied the Principle of Collective Security 
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on a universal scale. To them, collective security would be meaningful only if it 
applied to great as well as lesser powers. Thus these scholars have overly criticized 
the unrepresentative stature of the Security Council. They question the non 
inclusion of any African country in the membership of the UN Security Council 
considering the fact that Africa makes about one third membership of the U.N. The 
lack of geographical spread of members of the Security Council, no doubt, has a 
negative effect on the function and strength of the Council on the role of 
maintenance of global peace and security. The major issue here is that such 
members that feel their voices are only heard but of no policy consequence in 
protecting their interest feel withdrawn in U.N. actions of Collective Security. 
According to George Schwarzenberger, “Collective Security as understood at 
Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco meant collective security against danger to 
peace from the middle powers and small states and collective insecurity in the face 
of aggression by any of the world powers.” 
The above observation is corroborated by Inis Claude who asserts that “in the final 
analysis, the San Francisco Conference must be described as having repudiated the 
doctrine of Collective Security as the foundation for a general, universally 
applicable system for the management of power in international relations. The 
doctrine was given ideological lip service, and a scheme was contrived for making 
it effective in cases of relatively minor importance. But the new organization 
reflected the conviction that the concept of Collective Security has no realistic 
relevance to the problems posed by conflict among the major powers (Claude, 
1962). 
On the other hand, the concerted action of the United Nations in the Korean Crisis 
of the 1950 proved that Collective Security under the United Nations was possible. 
The enforcement action undertaken by the United Nations against North Korea that 
invaded South Korea in 1950 marks the first time the organized community of 
nations in accordance with the principles of Collective Security, has employed 
armed forces against an aggressor. 
When the United Nations found out that North Korea exhibited aggression against 
South Korea, it called upon members of the United Nations to send troops and 
other assistance to South Korea and it asked the United States President to 
designate a Supreme Commander of the UN Forces. Thus the United Nations 
demonstrated that even though it had no armed forces at its disposal, as provided 
for in Article 43 of the Charter, it was not impotent in the face of open aggression. 
But critics argued that the enforcement of UN action against North Korea was 
possible only because the Soviet delegate at the time was boycotting the meetings 
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of the Security Council. They argued that had he been present, he presumably 
would have vetoed any action against North Korea. To them, the action of the 
United States and of other United Nations members who supported enforcement 
actions does not necessarily reflect a commitment to resist aggression simply out of 
belief that the Principle of Collective Security deserved support. One of such critics 
is Arnold Wolfers who submitted that “instead of being a case of nations fighting 
any aggressor anywhere and for no other purpose than to punish aggression and to 
deter potential aggressors, intervention in Korea was an act of collective military 
defense against the recognized number-one enemy of the United States and of all 
countries which associated themselves with its action.” (Wolfers, 1962) 
These critics believed that, had South Korea been the aggressor, it seems unlikely 
that the non-communist states in the United Nations would have endorsed 
enforcement action for the benefit of the communist regime in North Korea. 
 
Conclusion 
Collective Security as an institutionalized mechanism for the maintenance of 
international peace and security has reduced tensions among states in the 
international community. It has done much by providing the framework for 
keeping conflicts from becoming major threats to international peace. As Palmer 
and Perkings pointed out, for Collective Security to be effective, it must be strong 
enough to cope with aggression from any power or combination of powers, and it 
must be invoked if and as aggression occurs. 
The direction of the United Nations Collective Security system has always been 
dictated by the world big powers especially the five permanent members of the UN 
Security Council. Small and medium powers feel left out in the Collective Security 
arrangement as they can only benefit from the system only when the interests of 
any of the “big gives” especially the United States are at stake. 
However, its weakness does not dismiss the system as wholly unuseful. The UN 
Collective Security system remains relevant and needed, but its radical defects 
must be attended to by admitting the added duty to prevent the spread of weapons 
of mass destruction and terrorism, which were not initially conceived and by 
enlarging the Security Council to take care of political interests of states perceived 
as orchestrating these new security challenges “since collective security system has 
always remained an idealistic concept which has never been defined by treaty and, 
therefore, can be hijacked by the powerful nations in the lopsided United Nations 
Security Council. 
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It is of great importance therefore, to harp on the need to institute a confidence-
building measure among the members of the United Nations so as to establish the 
requisite solidarity and cooperation for enduring global peace and security. To do 
this is to start genuine reforms as currently canvassed by member states of the 
United Nations; especially those of them from Asia, Latin America and Africa with 
enlargement and representation of the Security Council based on geographical 
location and power-relations. 
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Summary 
 
The Failure Of Collective Security In The Post World Wars I And II 
International System 
 
Joseph C. Ebegbulem 
University of Calabar, Nigeria 
 
The League of Nations and the United Nations Organization were two post-World 
War (World War I and World War II) organizations established for the 
maintenance of peace and security in the international system. One of the cardinal 
objectives of these organizations was the promotion of a Collective Security 
System which was considered as vital in the pursuit of global peace and security. In 
other words, Collective Security is an institutional mechanism established to 
address a comprehensive list of major threats to peace and security around the 
world. With the escalation of conflicts and wars in different parts of the world, 
there is therefore the need for collective responses at global, regional and national 
levels in conflict situations. The achievement of collective security in the 
international system would be based on the principle that any attack on any 
member of the United Nations would be considered as an attack on all the 
members. 
After a panoramic discourse of the meaning and nature of Collective Security, the 
paper also examines the problems of collective security in the international system; 
its failure under the League of Nations and the United Nations. The paper 
concludes that the weaknesses inherent in the system do not make it unuseful as it 
is a relevant factor in the maintenance of international peace and security. 
Key words: League of Nations, United Nations Organization, Collective Security system , 
international system, international peace and security, global peace, conflict situations. 
 
